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The area where the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet seems 
an isolated; very out of the way place for an unprecedented convergence of 
transnational organized crime groups to occur.  The Tri-Border Area (TBA) 
has become a major haven for drug and arms trafficking groups, money 
launderers, and sexual traffickers.  In the seemingly remote cities of Ciudad 
del Este and Foz do Iguacu, over $12 billion is laundered every year. Ciudad 
del Este is the commercial center of the TBA generating $13 billion a year in 
commercial transactions, both legal and illegal. Much of this business is 
generated as a result of the city’s position as a transshipment point in the 
robust drug and arms trafficking business. 
 
The TBA hosts criminal organizations from around the world.  But, it also 
has its own indigenous organized crime groups from Paraguay and Brazil.  
These native syndicates have helped to create a hospitable environment 
which hosts organized crime groups from Chile, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia and Taiwan.  The 
counterfeiting of CDs and CD-ROMs, as well as other pirated products, 
links local syndicates with foreign partners in Asia and the Middle East. 
 
Illicit commerce in the TBA is enhanced by virtually nonexistent 
immigration controls and pervasive governmental corruption. False identity 
documents, passports and visas, particularly Paraguayan, are easily obtained 
in the TBA.  Police and other government officials suffer from low pay; 
inadequate or nonexistent training; miserly funding from their central 
governments; bank secrecy laws, and very weak money laundering controls. 
In an atmosphere of pervasive governmental corruption and human rights 
abuses, corruption flourishes. 
 
Geography, Society and the Economy of Crime 
 
The TBA region is defined geographically by three main population centers: 
Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Foz do Iguaca, Brazil, and Ciudad del Este, 
Paraguay. Paraguayan economic planners tried to enhance the tourism 
business at Iguaza Falls, by creating a free-trade zone in the Ciudad del Este 
area. The hope was that Argentineans and Brazilians would cross the border 
in search of inexpensive merchandise, particularly electronic products. The 
net result, however, was the creation of a free trade zone for transnational 
organized crime groups.  
 
Between 1971 and 2001 the population of the TBA increased dramatically 
from about 60,000 to more than 700,000, primarily as a result of the 
construction of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Dam.  In addition, the TBA is a 
remarkably diverse little corner of the world.  For example, Foz de Iguacu is 
populated by 65 different nationalities, including about 7,000 Lebanese, 
30,000 Chinese, and 4,000 Koreans. In addition, the TBA has one of the 
largest Arab populations outside the Middle East. A 2001 report suggests 
that the TBA’s population includes 23,000 Arabs of Palestinian and 
Lebanese descent.  The area was marked by a significant Lebanese 
emigration during the 1970s civil war in Lebanon.  In Ciudad del Este and 
Foz do Iguacu, 90% of the Arab population is of Lebanese descent. 
 
Ciudad del Este is a South American version of Casablanca in the 1940s. 
The city is populated with intelligence agents and their informants.  Human 
traffickers, arms merchants and drug traffickers are omnipresent. On the 
city’s streets everything from the newest pirated computer software, to 
prostituted children, to AK-47s are easily obtainable.  An AK-47 sells in the 
street bazaars for $375. The city is also a prominent banking and retail 
center. In fact, Ciudad del Este’s retail economy is the third strongest in the 
world, ranking right behind Hong Kong and Miami.  The city has a bigger 
retail economy than the rest of Paraguay combined.  Lebanese and 
Palestinians operate many of the commercial enterprises in Ciudad del Este 
although they tend to reside in the Foz do Iguacu area of Brazil. 
 
State Corruption 
 
In many ways it is difficult to determine which of the three countries 
touching at the TBA is the most corrupt. Carlos Menem, the president of 
Argentina has resisted any attempts to reform the government and the courts. 
Menem has also been alleged to have been involved in a government cover-
up of a bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires and arms 
trafficking.  Menem, whose parents were Syrian immigrants to Argentina, 
appointed a Syrian army colonel as the head of customs at Buenos Aires’ 
Ezeiza International Airport, one of the prime smuggling entrepots in South 
America. 
 
In Brazil, an investigation by the Brazilian Congress in 2000, implicated 
congressmen, state governors, mayors, judges, and police officials in a series 
of criminal activities including arms and drug trafficking and tax evasion. 
That report suggested that Brazil’s entire police structure had to be torn 
down and reconfigured because of the pervasive drug-related corruption. A 
congressional investigation in 2002 implicated over 100 politicians, police, 
and businessmen in a massive cargo theft enterprise. 
 
Immigration fraud is abetted by pervasive corruption in the government of 
Paraguay.  One investigation found that annually an average of 570 
individuals enters Paraguay through the Ciudad del Este Airport with forged 
passports, visas, or identity documents.  That investigation found that a bribe 
of $5000 was sufficient to circumvent immigration controls. More recent 
investigations have centered on the ease with which Lebanese citizens have 
been able to enter Paraguay with false documentation. Ahmad Assad 
Barabat, a regional Hizballah leader, entered Paraguay with a false visa 
issued in Panama. The Paraguayan consul in Miami, Carlos Weis sold more 
than 300 passports, visas and bills of lading between 1999 and 2002. 
 
Obviously, the fidelity, honesty and effectiveness of police forces are central 
to controlling organized criminal activities.  Police corruption is a prime 
precondition for large-scale organized crime activity. Many issues help 
explain the total lack of effectiveness of the Argentinian police against 
organized crime.  First, the government is far more interested in repressing 
political dissent and maintaining public order than in fighting crime. Second, 
the Argentine judiciary moves with great deliberation at a snail-like pace, 
which is frustrating to many police.  As a result police frequently are 
engaged in brutality, framing suspects, and even murders and rapes. Finally, 
Argentinian police are paid the equivalent of about $400 a month.  For these 
reasons and many others, corruption is pervasive in the Argentinian security 
forces.   
             
But problems with corruption only begin to describe the difficulties of the 
Argentine police.  Since at least the 1970s the Argentine police have been 
integrally involved in organized crime activities, including prostitution, 
gambling and kidnapping. The Brazilian police are similarly hampered by 
widespread corruption and human rights abuses.  Brazilian state police 
forces have engaged in widespread murder, torture, and rape.  They 
routinely detain people without arrest outside of the law. Death-squad 
activity and vigilantism is epidemic in Brazilian policing. In addition, 
Brazilian police have been implicated in drug trafficking, kidnapping, and 
murder-for-hire schemes. Similarly, the Paraguayan police routinely engage 
in torture; death squad activities; the use of excessive force; illegal 
detention; and, wanton violations of privacy rights. Paraguayan police also 
engage in large-scale extortion from both legitimate and illegitimate 
businessmen, particularly Arabs and others of foreign descent. The police 
force of Ciudad del Este is widely regarded as pervasively corrupt.  Law 
enforcement largely depends on private security services.  All of the 6,000 
stores and shops, the 36 banks and the 15 money exchanges in the city 
employ private guards. 
 
Organizing Crime in the TBA 
 
The TBA is a perfect environment for thriving illicit enterprises and the 
operations of organized crime groups.  Money laundering laws are lax.  The 
governments and police forces are thoroughly corrupt. Unregulated 
commerce thrives.  Immigration controls are easily circumvented.  As a 
result a confluence of both indigenous and transnational organized crime 
groups has set up operation in the area. Criminal organizations engaged in 
the trafficking of drugs, guns, children and women flourish.  Financial and 
business crimes are easily conducted.  Smuggling of stolen goods and 
counterfeiting of other products occurs without interference. While 
organized crime in the TBA may be thought of as in its developmental 
stages, the conditions for the success of these incipient enterprises are all 
present. 
 
Luiz Fernando Da Costa heads one of the local organized crime groups. For 
years Da Costa ran a criminal organization in Brazil that traded arms for 
cocaine. Da Costa operated in the TBA until 2001.  Since then he is rumored 
to have moved his base of operation of Colombia.  Organized crime in 
Brazil has become much bolder and more violent in recent years. In 2002 the 
country narrowly averted an attempt by organized crime to bomb the Sao 
Paulo Stock Exchange.  In 2003, drug organizations engaged in running 
battles with police in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, snarling traffic and 
paralyzing the city’s business district. Also in 2003 organized crime groups 
assassinated two Brazilian judges. Additionally, Brazil’s most prominent 
prison gang has close ties to both Da Costa and to Italian organized crime 
figures. In the TBA, organized crime gunmen attempted the assassination of 
the Foz do Iguaca city council president. 
 
Cuidad del Este is, for all intents and purposes, a free trade zone for 
organized crime. Money laundering, the theft of intellectual property, human 
trafficking, alien smuggling, arms trafficking and drug trafficking all 
flourish. A significant portion of the illicit market revolves around trades of 
drugs for arms involving Colombian organized crime and political groups. 
One of the largest criminal organizations in the Ciudad del Este area is the 
arms trafficking syndicate run by Elvio Ramon Contero Aguero, out of the 
town of Pedro Juan Caballero on the Brazilian border. General Lino Cesar 
Oviedo, the head of the Paraguayan Cartel is also based in Ciudad del Este 
and Foz do Iguacu. The Paraguayan Cartel was responsible for multi-ton 
cocaine shipments originating in the TBA during the 1990s, as well as for 
massive money laundering operations in the TBA. Closely associated with 
the activities of the Paraguayan Cartel is Paraguayan General Jose Tomas 
Centurion. 
 
In addition to local generals and crime lords, criminal syndicates from 
around the world operate in the TBA, in close association with Paraguayan 
businessmen, politicians, the military, and the ruling Colorado Party. 
Colombian, Italian and Nigerian organized crime groups all operate in the 
TBA.  
 
The social demography of Ciudad del Este makes it a perfect location for the 
operations of Chinese organized crime groups, including the Fuk Ching, Big 
Circle Boys, Flying Dragons and Tai Chen. Chinese organized crime groups 
run protection rackets in Ciudad del Este’s Chinese community and engage 
in large-scale trafficking in counterfeit products. In addition, Korean 
organized crime groups with branches in Ciudad del Este, San Francisco, 
Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, and Santa Cruz (Bolivia), are active in the region. 
Two Canton-based Chinese organized crime groups, the Fu Shin and the Fei 
Jeii are also active in Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu. Chinese organized 
crime groups have been able to maintain virtual immunity from prosecution 
in the TBA because of bribes paid to Paraguayan judges. Several other 
Chinese organized crime groups in the TBA deal primarily in 
counterfeiting.  The Sung-I and Ming groups have worked closely in the 
Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya (a group closely associated with Hizballah) in a 
product-counterfeiting scheme. 
 
Russian organized crime groups have initiated activities in Paraguay as well, 
primarily with the intention of trafficking cocaine to Europe, although they 
appear not to be setting up permanent operations in the TBA.   Russian 
organized crime groups have also opened up contacts in Brazil with the 
intent of procuring Brazilian women for prostitution operations in Israel. The 
Russian groups may well be paying for drugs and women with arms.  In the 
late 1990s AK-47s and AR-15s have become more and more common as the 
weapons for choice for indigenous organized groups in the TBA and 
adjoining countries.  Chechen organized crime groups have also made 
contact with drug traffickers and money launderers in the TBA from their 
base in Argentina. Presumably, the Chechen are attempting to open up 
another guns-for-drug conduit through the TBA.  
  
Organized Crime Enterprises in the TBA 
 
The three countries, which converge in the TBA, have similar characteristics 
with regard to the drug business.  Argentina is not known as a drug 
producing country, but it does serve as a transshipment conduit for cocaine 
from Bolivia and heroin from Colombia. Brazil acts as a middleman in the 
trade between Western European nations and the United States in the 
precursor chemicals essential to the production of methamphetamine. 
Paraguay also serves as a transshipment site for cocaine moving out of Peru.  
The TBA is primarily an area through which drugs destined for Argentina, 
Brazil and Paraguay pass.  The existence of more than 100 clandestine 
airstrips in the TBA enhances its utility as a transit point for both drugs and 
arms. This is particularly the case with cocaine, which is usually moved by 
small aircraft. 
 
About $12 billion in illicit profits are laundered each year in the TBA.  
Money launderers use the banks and currency exchange businesses in 
Cuidad del Este and Fdoz do Iguaca to engage in fraudulent financial 
transactions.  Money laundering activity is pervasive in the financial 
industry, particularly through Brazilian and Paraguayan banks operating in 
the TBA. The Central Bank of Brazil estimates that 17 percent of the profits 
generated by Colombian drug cartels are laundered through the Brazilian 
bank system. Brazilian investigators estimate that 40 percent of the local 
businesses in Foz do Iguaca and nothing more than fronts established by 
organized crime groups for the purpose of laundering money.  Paraguay is 
internationally recognized as a major money-laundering center. Almost all 
of Paraguay’s $5 billion money laundering activity occurs in Ciudad del 
Este. 
 
The theft, smuggling and transport of luxury cars is also a major business in 
the TBA. Cars that are stolen in Brazil and Argentina are moved to 
Paraguay, Bolivia, and other points of embarkation through the TBA. More 
than half of the 450,000 vehicles registered by drivers in Paraguay are 
acquired through illegal channels. Stolen automobiles and other contraband 
pass along an illegally opened road cutting through the Iguau National Park.  
The Asuncion-Paraguayan Highway is also a major conduit for contraband. 
Counterfeiting and pirating commercial products is also a booming business 
in the TBA. More than half of all the business software utilized in Brazil is 
pirated.  Forty percent of the cigarettes entering Brazil are illegal contraband 
smuggled into the country.  The large Arab community in the TBA seems to 
dominate the black market in counterfeit and pirated goods. Some 
investigators have suggested that bootlegged computer software and CDs are 
used to raise money for Hizballah and Hamas. Ciudad del Este is the major 
transshipment point for counterfeit CDs and CD-ROMs entering South 
America from Hong Kong, Macau, Malaysia and Thailand.  About $1.5 
billion worth of these counterfeits move through Ciudad del Este each year. 
Estimates suggest that 90 percent of the commercial goods sold by stores, 
street vendors, and other agents in Cuidad del Este are counterfeit. 
Paraguayan law permits patents to be issued for international brand names 
by the National Brand Register, thereby facilitating the pirating of 
contraband merchandise. Much of the counterfeiting activity is directly 
linked to organized crime groups operating in Korea, Lebanon and Taiwan. 
The International Intellectual Property Alliance has identified Paraguay as 
their most serious problem nation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Social, political, economic and geographic variables have come together to 
create a perfect environment for sustaining organized crime in the TBA.  
The TBA is distant from other major population centers, and far from the 
seat of state power in any of the three affected nations. But even if it weren’t 
geographically isolated, the pervasive political and law enforcement 
corruption which defines the state in Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina would 
still be a significant contributor to the creation of an organized crime 
entrepot.  Lack of banking regulations and extremely permissive banking 
enforcement in Brazil and Paraguay create a perfect environment for money 
laundering, which in turn fosters the drug and arms markets.  The same 
preconditions, which have sustained indigenous organized crime, create an 
attractive environment for the operations of transnational criminal 
organizations. 
 
The essential unanswered question, however, is whether this set of 
circumstances is simply a happy coincidence for organized crime or whether 
its genesis has more sinister roots. It strains credulity to suggest that tens of 
thousands of Lebanese Arabs, Taiwanese and Koreans simply happened to 
wander into this South American backwater. In fact, it strains credulity to 
suggest that they even knew of Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu, let alone 
the no doubt beautiful Iguaza Falls.   
 
So how did this organized crime boomtown come to pass?  On that point 
there is scant evidence.  It is possible that transnational organized crime 
groups did identify the potential for the area as a result of their normal 
course of business, which particularly in the case of the Taiwanese may have 
involved Paraguay.  It is harder to explain the Arab migration to the jungles 
of the TBA.  The U.S. government seems to suspect that this may be part of 
a master plan to fund Islamic extremist groups through illicit enterprise.  But 
the existence of many, many lawless states closer to the Middle East still 
makes it difficult to conclude that the obvious location for such a complex 
and sinister plot was a remote corner of Paraguay.  Other speculations are 
also possible.  We have seen over the decades the hidden hand of the CIA 
and the Mossad nudging some organized criminal enterprises into action for 
a specific purpose. The answer may lie in a combination of all these things.  
But at the moment, the mystery of South America’s 21
st
 Century Casablanca 
is just that, a mystery. 
 
